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KISOR’S CHAOS: CONFLICTING MEANINGS
OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT’S “APPLICABLE
REQUIREMENTS” IN THE FIFTH AND
TENTH CIRCUITS
Marissa Corry*

ABSTRACT
“Although [the administrative state] [is] . . . unrecognized by the Constitution, it has become the government’s primary mode of controlling Americans, and it increasingly imposes profound restrictions on their liberty.”1
As this statement suggests, administrative agencies wield immense power
and influence over the everyday lives of American citizens. In recent years,
concern about the extensive power of the administrative state has led
courts, policymakers, and the public to advocate for enhanced constraints
on administrative agencies.
One such constraint is allowing courts to determine the meaning of a
statute or regulation instead of deferring to an agency’s interpretation of
such statute or regulation. But this constraint comes at a cost. By making it
more difficult for agencies to receive deference, courts create more uncertainty regarding the meaning of a particular statute or regulation. Without
clear guidance on the meaning of the law, American citizens will struggle to
comply with the law. In effect, the amount of power wielded by administrative agencies entails a trade-off between making administrative agencies
more accountable to the public and ensuring the public understands what
the law means.
This Comment discusses a recent circuit split between the U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits over how to interpret the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation defining the “applicable requirements” for obtaining a Title V permit under the Clean Air Act. This
conflict demonstrates the confusion and inconsistency plaguing lower
courts over the application of the different standards of agency deference.
As a result, the meaning of a particular statute or regulation can vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This Comment proposes a solution for reworking the regulatory deference framework that will promote clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of statutes and regulations. The proposed
solution suggests that the Supreme Court should restore Auer to its
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2022; B.A., Political Science & Psychology, Southern Methodist University, 2019. The author would like to thank her family,
especially her mom and dad, for all their encouragement and support.
1. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1 (2014).
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“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard2 and add a
second step when an agency announces a new interpretation of a regulation
that conflicts with its prior interpretation.3 Under this second step, courts
would take a “hard look” at the agency’s new interpretation to see if the
agency provided a reasoned explanation for its changed position.4 This approach would give agencies the flexibility to update regulations in response
to changed circumstances while also providing courts with the oversight
necessary to ensure an agency’s proposed interpretation aligns with “what
the law is.”5
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2. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 453 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
3. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,
56–57 (1983); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–16 (2009).
4. See Jennifer Nou, Regulatory Textualism, 65 DUKE L.J. 81, 113, 148–50 (2015).
5. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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I. INTRODUCTION

A

S Chief Justice John Marshall once proclaimed, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”6 However, at the same time, “[t]he province of
the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire
how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion.”7 These statements, made long before the rise of the
modern administrative state, reflect the fundamental conflict that pervades administrative law today—balancing the need to defer to agency
expertise with the judiciary’s obligation to say what the law is. As the
Supreme Court recently recognized, “sometimes the law runs out, and
policy-laden choice is what is left over.”8 Under such circumstances,
courts presume that Congress would want the administrative agency to
resolve the ambiguity rather than a court.9 This rebuttable presumption
arises because, unlike courts, administrative agencies have substantive expertise in matters falling under their authority and are more politically
accountable to the people via presidential oversight.10 However, courts
struggle to delineate where the law runs out and policy choices begin.
To help judges differentiate between these two areas, the Supreme
Court developed several doctrines that determine when deference to an
agency’s interpretation is appropriate. The two main doctrines are Chevron, which applies to agency interpretations of statutes,11 and Auer, which
applies to agency interpretations of regulations.12 When these doctrines
were first announced, they were simple and relatively straightforward for
courts to apply.13 However, over time courts became concerned that
these deference doctrines allowed agencies to take over the court’s duty
to say what the law is.14 As a result, courts established additional requirements that agencies must meet to receive deference.15
This Comment discusses a recent circuit split between the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits over how to interpret the Clean Air Act’s “applicable requirements” for purposes of Title V permitting. Specifically, the central
question involved in the dispute is whether the Title V permitting process
may be used to second-guess prior preconstruction permitting decisions
6. Id.
7. Id. at 170.
8. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
9. See id. at 2412.
10. See id. at 2413.
11. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
12. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
13. Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN.
L. REV. HEADNOTES 103, 107 (2019).
14. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 128–29, 131–32 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
15. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 13, at 107.
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made under Title I.16 In discussing this conflict, this Comment aims (1) to
illustrate the widespread confusion plaguing lower courts in applying deference doctrines despite the Supreme Court’s recent attempts to refine
these doctrines and (2) to encourage courts and policymakers to prioritize
clarity and uniformity when addressing statutory and regulatory deference in the future.
Part II of this Comment begins with a broad overview of the Clean Air
Act, focusing on Title I and Title V, which are both central to understanding the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the Act’s
applicable requirements. Next, Part II introduces the statute the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claimed to interpret before the Fifth
Circuit and the regulation the EPA claimed to interpret before the Tenth
Circuit. Finally, Part II describes the different deference standards that
apply to an agency’s interpretation of a statute (Chevron and Skidmore)
and the agency’s own regulation (Auer and Skidmore).
Part III proceeds by detailing the EPA’s reasons for changing its interpretation of its regulation as set forth under the 2017 Hunter Order.
Next, Part III examines the Tenth Circuit’s decision not to give Auer deference to the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation. Lastly, Part III
outlines the Fifth Circuit’s decision to give Skidmore deference to the
EPA’s interpretation of the statute.
Part IV argues that the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion—that the regulation
is unambiguous—is the right result under the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, given that courts must “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of
construction” before concluding the regulation is ambiguous.17 However,
Part IV also criticizes the Tenth Circuit’s overly textualist approach because it ignores a latent ambiguity in the regulation. Next, Part IV explains that, under Chenery, the Fifth Circuit only should have considered
the EPA’s regulatory interpretation and not its statutory interpretation.18
Nevertheless, Part IV argues that if the Supreme Court were to consider
the issue, the Court likely would uphold the EPA’s regulatory interpretation as the Fifth Circuit did. Part IV concludes by examining three commonly suggested solutions to reforming Auer and explaining why these
solutions will not resolve the confusion surrounding Auer in the lower
courts. Instead, Part IV offers a new solution: to restore Auer to its
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent” standard and require agencies to provide a reasoned explanation when the agency’s new interpretation conflicts with a prior one.

16. See infra Part III.
17. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
18. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
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II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY INTERPRETATION
A. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Congress first passed the Clean Air Act in 1970 in response to rising
concerns about the impact of air pollution on public health.19 In the same
year, Congress also established the EPA.20 The Act authorizes the EPA
to set limits on the amount of certain air pollutants and to limit emissions
from specific sources such as chemical plants and utilities.21 Under the
Act, the EPA must approve state implementation plans (SIPs) designed
to reduce air pollution.22 In developing a SIP, the state must provide the
public and local industries with the opportunity to comment on the
plan.23 If a state fails to develop an adequate plan, the EPA can impose
sanctions and take over enforcement of the Act if necessary.24 However,
factors that contribute to pollution vary from region to region, and local
governments usually have a better understanding of these region-specific
factors.25 Therefore, the EPA mostly leaves enforcement of the Act up to
local governments.26 Nevertheless, if the EPA finds that an operator has
violated the Act, the EPA can issue an order of compliance, impose a
penalty fee, or bring a civil judicial action against the violator.27
Under Title V of the Act, each state must establish an operating permit
program to ensure that major stationary sources of pollution comply with
the applicable requirements of the Act and the SIP.28 Congress first established this requirement in the 1990 amendments to the Act.29 The operating permit generally must state the types of pollutants being released,
the levels of pollutants that may be released in the future, the steps that
the operator will take to reduce pollution as required by the Act, and a
plan to measure and report emissions.30 These permits are useful because
they compile all information relating to a source’s air pollution in one
place.31 The EPA must approve each state’s Title V permitting program
to ensure it meets the applicable permitting requirements.32 Before approving a permit, the state must provide an opportunity for public comment and a hearing.33 Moreover, states must submit each proposed
operating permit to the EPA for review, and the EPA has forty-five days
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

EPA, THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT 2 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 19.
42 U.S.C. § 7661a; EPA, supra note 19, at 7.
EPA, supra note 19, at 19.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d)(1).
Id. § 7661a(b)(6).
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to object to the proposed permit.34 If the EPA does not object, any person may petition the EPA to object to the permit within sixty days of the
expiration of the EPA’s review period.35
Similar to Title V, the major New Source Review (NSR) program
under Title I also requires major stationary sources to obtain permits.36
The major NSR program has two components: the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program under Part C of Title I and the nonattainment NSR program under Part D of Title I.37 The PSD program
applies in areas that are meeting the EPA’s National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), while the nonattainment NSR program applies
in areas that are not meeting such standards.38 Congress first established
these programs in the 1990 amendments to the Act.39
The PSD program requires major stationary sources to obtain a PSD
permit before constructing a new facility or modifying an existing facility.40 Every state must establish requirements for obtaining a PSD permit
in their SIP;41 thus, the EPA will approve of such permitting program
when approving the SIP. To obtain the PSD permit, the operator must
show that the proposed facility will not cause air pollution in excess of
any NAAQS and will employ the best available control technology for
any emitted pollutants subject to regulation under the Act.42 Similar to
the PSD program, the nonattainment NSR program requires major stationary sources to obtain a nonattainment NSR permit before constructing a new facility or modifying an existing one.43 Although nonattainment
NSR permits will be customized for each source, the permit must generally require “(1) the installation of the lowest achievable emission rate
(LAER), (2) emission offsets, and (3) opportunity for public
involvement.”44
In addition to the major NSR program, the Act also includes a minor
NSR program.45 The minor NSR program requires minor sources to obtain a permit before constructing a new source or modifying an existing
source.46 Minor modifications made by a major source also fall under the
34. Id. § 7661d(b)(1).
35. Id. § 7661d(b)(2).
36. PacifiCorp Energy, Hunter Power Plant, Emery, Utah, Permit No. 1500101002,
Petition No. VIII-2016-4, at 4 (EPA Oct. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Hunter Order], https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/pacificorp_hunter_order_denying_
title_v_petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4HH-Z96T] (the EPA’s order denying Sierra Club’s
petition to object to a Title V operating permit issued to the Hunter Power Plant).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4–5.
39. Id. at 15.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C).
41. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(c).
42. Id. § 7475(a)(3)–(4).
43. Nonattainment NSR Basic Information, EPA (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/
nsr/nonattainment-nsr-basic-information [https://perma.cc/C686-P5ZG].
44. Id.
45. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 5.
46. Id.
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NSR program.47 States must provide the EPA with copies of all major
NSR permit applications and notice of all actions taken in consideration
of such permits.48 Because NSR permits are issued before operating permits, the relationship between Title I and Title V is important in considering the central question discussed in this Comment—whether a valid
NSR permit is an applicable requirement for issuing a Title V operating
permit.
B. THE STATUTE: APPROVING PERMITS UNDER TITLE V
CLEAN AIR ACT

OF THE

Title V of the Clean Air Act imposes the following conditions:
Each permit issued under this subchapter shall include enforceable
emission limitations and standards, a schedule of compliance, a requirement that the permittee submit to the permitting authority, no
less often than every 6 months, the results of any required monitoring, and such other conditions as are necessary to assure compliance
with applicable requirements of this chapter, including the requirements of the applicable implementation plan.49
The Act does not define applicable requirements nor does the statute
otherwise specify how to determine such requirements.50 However, under
§ 7661a(b)(1), Congress directs the EPA to promulgate “regulations establishing the minimum elements of a permit program.”51 Therefore, the
EPA issued a regulation defining the applicable requirements to obtain a
Title V operating permit.52
C. THE REGULATION: THE MEANING
REQUIREMENTS”

OF

“APPLICABLE

The EPA’s regulation governing the Title V program provides the
following:
Applicable requirement means all of the following as they apply to
the emission units in a part 70 source . . . :
(1) Any standard or other requirement provided for in the applicable implementation plan approved or promulgated by the EPA
through rulemaking under title I of the Act that implements the
relevant requirements of the Act, including any revisions to that
plan promulgated in part 52 of this chapter;
(2) Any term or condition of any preconstruction permits issued
pursuant to regulations approved or promulgated through
rulemaking under title I, including parts C or D, of the Act;53
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 7475(d)(1).
Id. § 7661c(a) (emphasis added).
Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 8–9.
§ 7661a(b)(1).
40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2011).
Id.
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As the EPA recently acknowledged, § 70.2(2) clearly includes the terms
and conditions of major NSR permits (which include PSD permits under
Part C and nonattainment NSR permits under Part D) issued under Title
I as applicable requirements for purposes of Title V.54 However, because
§ 70.2(2) includes “[a]ny term or condition of any preconstruction permit[ ],” the terms and conditions of a minor NSR permit issued pursuant
to an approved SIP are also applicable requirements for purposes of Title
V.55 As the EPA explains in the Hunter Order, this language reflects a
change from the original proposed language of § 70.2(2), which only
would have covered major NSR permits.56
Although the text of the regulation appears unambiguous on its face, a
latent ambiguity arises between § 70.2(1) and § 70.2(2) when, for instance, a state permitting authority incorrectly issues a minor NSR permit
instead of a major NSR permit.57 Under such circumstances, there are
two different ways to interpret § 70.2(1). On the one hand, because a
valid major NSR permit is a “standard or other requirement provided for
in the applicable implementation plan,”58 § 70.2(1) could suggest that any
errors in prior preconstruction permits must be corrected as part of the
Title V permit.59 On the other hand, because the terms and conditions of
a minor NSR permit are also applicable requirements, § 70.2(1) could
also suggest that the terms and conditions of prior preconstruction permits, even if incorrectly issued, should be incorporated into the Title V
permit “without further review.”60 In effect, the conflict centers around
whether the Title V permit process should be used to reverse prior
preconstruction permitting decisions made by state authorities.
Over the years, the EPA has adopted conflicting positions over how to
interpret the regulation. When the EPA first proposed § 70.2, the Agency
took the position that the Tile V permit process should not be used to
question the validity of a prior preconstruction permit.61 For example, the
EPA indicated that the terms and conditions of a prior preconstruction
permit will be incorporated into the Title V permit “without further review” as long as the source is complying with the preconstruction permit.62 Additionally, in the proposed rule, the EPA indicated that “[t]he
intent of title V is not to second-guess the results of any State NSR program.”63 These statements are important because the Supreme Court
consistently focuses on the regulation’s original meaning.64 In fact, one
54. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 9.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 6–7; Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 2020).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 70.2(1) (2011).
59. See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 8.
60. See id. at 11.
61. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 893–94 (10th Cir. 2020).
62. Operating Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,738–39 (proposed May 10,
1991) (emphasis added) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
63. Id. at 21,739.
64. See, e.g., Mullins Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135,
159 (1987).

2021]

Kisor’s Chaos

757

rationale the Court commonly gives for Auer deference is that “the
agency that promulgated a rule is in [a] ‘better position [to] reconstruct its
original meaning.’”65 In this case, there seems to be little room to question the regulation’s original meaning based on the statements referenced
above.
However, in the late 1990s, the EPA shifted away from its original understanding of the regulation. Under the EPA’s new understanding of
§ 70.2(1), the Title V permitting process could include consideration of
whether preconstruction permits were appropriately issued.66 For instance, the EPA stated that “the merits of PSD issues can be ripe for
consideration in a timely petition to object under Title V.”67 Additionally, in a 1999 letter, John Seitz, the Director of the Office of Air Quality
and Planning, indicated that Title V permits “include the requirement to
obtain preconstruction permits that comply with applicable preconstruction review requirements under the Act, EPA regulations, and [SIPs].”68
However, Seitz also suggested that the EPA generally would not object to
a Title V permit based on a preconstruction permit that was issued a long
time ago.69 Until recently, the EPA continued to treat preconstruction
permits as ripe for review in the Title V permitting process. However, in
2017, the EPA reverted to its original interpretation of the regulation.70
The EPA first announced this change in an order upholding a Title V
permit issued to PacifiCorp Energy’s Hunter Power Plant (the Hunter
Order),71 which will be further discussed in Part III of this Comment.
D. OVERVIEW

OF

STATUTORY

AND

REGULATORY DEFERENCE

1. Statutory Deference: Chevron and Skidmore
Deference doctrines such as Chevron and Skidmore only apply if the
statute is ambiguous.72 If the meaning of the statute is clear, courts are
bound to follow Congress’s clearly expressed intent.73 First announced in
1984, the Chevron doctrine directs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute in certain circumstances.74 As originally
65. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412 (2019) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety
& Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151–53 (1991)).
66. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 11.
67. Shintech, Inc., Permit Nos. 2466-VO, 2467-VO, 2468-VO, at 3 n.2 (EPA Sept. 10,
1997), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-08/documents/shintech_decision1997.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2M2E-4AT6].
68. Letter from John S. Seitz. EPA Off. of Air Quality Plan. & Standards, to Robert
Hodanbosi and Charles Lagges, Ass’n of Local Air Pollution Control Officers (May 20,
1999).
69. Id.
70. See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 13–20.
71. Id. at 1.
72. See, e.g., Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative
State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 794 (2010).
73. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241–42 (2007).
74. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
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conceived, Chevron deference applies if an agency can show that (1) Congress has not directly spoken on the issue in question, and (2) the
agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.75 In
justifying this two-step framework, the Court reasoned that Congress either implicitly or explicitly delegates authority to the agency to resolve
any ambiguity in the statute.76 Additionally, the Court thought that agencies are in a better position to interpret an ambiguous statute due to their
subject matter expertise.77 At first, scholars and judges praised Chevron
as an opportunity to bring clarity to a complex area of the law.78 However, over time, extensive criticism of Chevron arose, and courts began to
impose additional criteria for agencies to meet before a court would defer
to the agency’s statutory interpretation.79
In United States v. Mead Corp.,80 the Court first announced what has
come to be known as Chevron “step zero.”81 Under Mead, the Court held
that Chevron only applies when (1) Congress delegates authority to the
agency to make rules carrying the force of law, and (2) the interpretation
was adopted in the exercise of such authority.82 Generally, rules carry the
force of law when Congress provides “for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force.”83 In the overwhelming majority
of the Court’s cases applying Chevron, rules carrying the force of law are
the result of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudications.84
However, Chevron could still apply even in the absence of these formal
procedures if there is “some other indication” that Congress intended the
agency’s interpretation to carry the force of law.85
In Barnhart v. Walton, the Court clarified when Chevron deference
would apply in the absence of formal administrative procedures.86 According to Barnhart, whether Chevron is appropriate depends upon “the
interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute,
the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the
Agency has given the question over a long period of time.”87 In sum, to
apply Chevron, courts must first determine whether Chevron applies at
all (i.e., whether the rule carries the force of law).88 Then, the court must
75. See id. at 842–43.
76. See id. at 843–44.
77. See id. at 844–45.
78. See, e.g., Hickman & Thomson, supra note 13, at 107.
79. See id. at 107–10.
80. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
81. See id. at 226–27; see also, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187, 191 (2006).
82. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
83. Id. at 230.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 227.
86. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
87. Id.
88. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.

2021]

Kisor’s Chaos

759

perform the Chevron two-step analysis (i.e., whether Congress directly
spoke on the issue and whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable).89 Due to this increased complexity, Chevron has resulted in more
confusion than clarity.90
Further complicating the inquiry, Mead held that courts must consider
whether Skidmore deference applies when Chevron step zero is not
met.91 Whether an interpretation receives Skidmore deference “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”92 In contrast to Chevron, where a court must defer to the agency’s
interpretation as long as it’s reasonable, a court only needs to defer under
Skidmore if it finds the agency’s interpretation persuasive.93 However,
scholars disagree about the level of deference that Skidmore entails,94
and empirical evidence reveals an inconsistent application of Skidmore by
circuit courts.95 While some courts treat Skidmore as a no-deference standard, the majority of courts give substantial deference to agency interpretations under Skidmore.96 Additionally, there is a lack of uniformity in
applying the Skidmore factors amongst courts that treat it as a substantial
deference standard.97 Therefore, Mead’s revival of Skidmore has only added to the confusion surrounding Chevron.
2. Regulatory Deference: Auer and Skidmore
In 1945 in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the Supreme Court
first suggested that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation should
be entitled to “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”98 Over fifty years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed regulatory deference under Seminole Rock in Auer v. Robbins.99 Until recently, Auer was the strongest form of deference, with evidence showing that courts deferred to the agency in 90.9% of cases.100
However, in recent years, the Supreme Court has imposed additional limitations for the doctrine to apply, leading to a decline in Auer defer89. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
90. See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
91. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
92. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
93. See id.
94. See Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119
YALE L.J. 2096, 2125 (2010).
95. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 73, at 1271.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1281–91.
98. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
99. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
100. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008).
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ence.101 Nevertheless, despite recent criticism of the doctrine by several
Justices,102 the Supreme Court refused to overturn Auer in Kisor v. Wilkie.103 However, the Court’s decision to uphold the doctrine was not unqualified; the majority opinion emphasized the limits of Auer’s
application.104
According to the Kisor majority, generally, for Auer to apply, (1) the
regulation must be genuinely ambiguous, (2) the agency’s reading must
be reasonable, and (3) the character and context of the agency’s interpretation must be entitled to controlling weight.105 Because these limitations
drastically differ from Auer’s prior “plainly erroneous or inconsistent”
standard,106 Kisor arguably overruled Auer deference despite the Court’s
insistence on upholding the doctrine.107 Kisor’s first limitation provides
that deference will not be granted unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.108 To determine whether a rule is ambiguous, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.”109 The “traditional tools”
of construction include the text, structure, history, and purpose of the
regulation, all of which should be “carefully consider[ed]” as “if [the
court] had no agency to fall back on.”110 However, if courts actually do
exhaust all the tools of construction, there will be little room to conclude
the regulation is ambiguous.111 Without a finding of ambiguity, “[t]he regulation then just means what it means—and the court must give it effect,
as the court would any other law.”112
Additionally, even if the regulation is ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation of the regulation must still be “reasonable.”113 An interpretation is reasonable if it falls “within the zone of ambiguity the court has
identified after employing all its interpretive tools.”114 Lastly, the court
must make “an independent inquiry” as to whether Auer deference is
appropriate under the circumstances.115 This independent inquiry should
center around whether Congress would want the agency rather than the
101. Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk America, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
813, 816 (2015) (finding that Auer deference fell to about 70.6% after some Justices criticized the doctrine in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center).
102. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 112–13 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
103. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019).
104. Id. at 2414.
105. Id. at 2415–16.
106. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
107. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408.
108. Id. at 2415.
109. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984)).
110. Id.
111. See id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2415 (majority opinion).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2415–16.
115. Id. at 2416.
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courts to resolve the ambiguity.116
The Supreme Court has set forth a number of factors that indicate that
Congress would want the agency rather than a court to resolve the ambiguity. First, the regulatory interpretation “must be the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any m[e]re ad hoc statement not
reflecting the agency’s views.”117 Second, the “agency’s interpretation
must in some way implicate its substantive expertise.”118 Thus, courts
should not grant Auer deference when “‘[t]he subject matter of the [dispute is] distan[t] from the agency’s ordinary’ duties or ‘fall[s] within the
scope of another agency’s authority.’”119 Third, the interpretation must
reflect the agency’s “fair and considered judgment.”120 Under this factor,
a court may not defer if the interpretation is merely “a convenient litigating position.”121 Moreover, courts should not defer if the agency announces a new interpretation that conflicts with a prior one and causes
“unfair surprise” for regulated parties.122 In sum, the Auer deference that
exists today is not the “super deference” it once was because courts have
substantial power to independently review the meaning of agency regulations.123 However, Kisor’s “attempt to remodel Auer’s rule into a multistep, multi-factor inquiry guarantees more uncertainty and much
litigation.”124
Moreover, regulatory interpretation is further complicated by Skidmore deference. Similar to the Chevron context, courts must consider
whether the agency’s regulatory interpretation warrants Skidmore deference even when Auer does not apply.125 In such a scenario, courts should
defer to the agency’s interpretation only to the extent it has “the power to
persuade.”126 However, the limitations on Auer announced in Kisor
largely overlap with the Skidmore factors. As a result, “the cases in which
Auer deference is warranted largely overlap with the cases in which it
would be unreasonable for a court not to be persuaded by an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation.”127
This similarity begs the question of whether the Auer and Skidmore
deference doctrines are one and the same. Chief Justice Roberts believes
there is a difference between the two.128 On the other hand, Justice Gor116. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 236–37 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2417.
119. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC., 569 U.S. 290, 309
(2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
120. Id. (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012)).
121. Id. (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155).
122. Id. at 2417–18 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170
(2007)).
123. See id. at 2416, 2419.
124. Id. at 2447 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 2414 (majority opinion) (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 159).
126. Id. (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 159).
127. Id. at 2424–25 (Roberts, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 2424.
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such suggests that Kisor “leaves Auer so riddled with holes that . . . courts
may find that it does not constrain their independent judgment any more
than Skidmore.”129 In conclusion, Auer deference today more closely resembles Skidmore deference, leaving the judiciary with greater discretion
to determine the meaning of an agency’s regulation. However, at the
same time, Kisor’s limitations on Auer have transformed it into an unworkable standard,130 causing increased confusion in the lower courts as
evident by the circuit split discussed in this Comment.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE MEANING OF “APPLICABLE
REQUIREMENTS”
A. THE HUNTER ORDER: THE EPA’S INTERPRETATION
REGULATION

OF

ITS

The EPA first announced its new interpretation of the regulation in
2017 under the Hunter Order.131 The Hunter Order was a response to a
petition by the Sierra Club requesting the EPA to object to a Title V
operating permit issued to the Hunter Power Plant.132 The Utah Division
of Air Quality (UDAQ) initially issued the permit to the Hunter Power
Plant in 1998, but as a result of permit modifications, UDAQ submitted a
new Title V permit to the EPA on January 11, 2016.133 The EPA did not
object to the proposed permit within its forty-five-day review period, and
UDAQ therefore issued the final permit on March 3, 2016.134 Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2), Sierra Club petitioned the EPA to object to the
permit within sixty days after the expiration of the EPA’s review
period.135
In its petition, Sierra Club argued the Title V permit was invalid because it did not comply with the PSD permitting program, an applicable
requirement of the Act.136 Specifically, Sierra Club argued that boiler turbine upgrades at the Hunter Power Plant made between 1997 and 1999
were “major modifications” that should have required a PSD permit.137
In 1997, UDAQ determined that the upgrades were not major modifications, and thus, were not subject to PSD permitting requirements.138 Instead, UDAQ determined the upgrades were “minor modifications to a
major source,”139 and thus, were subject to “only the barest of requirements” under the minor NSR program.140 However, Sierra Club argued
129. Id. at 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
130. See id. at 2446.
131. See generally Hunter Order, supra note 36.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 7.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 5, 9; see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 2020).
140. Sierra Club, 964 F.3d at 886 (quoting Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 675 F.3d
917, 922 (5th Cir. 2012)).
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UDAQ did not use the test established by the Utah SIP for identifying
major modifications.141 According to Sierra Club’s calculations, if UDAQ
had employed the correct test, the modifications would have triggered the
requirements of the major PSD permitting program.142 In effect, Sierra
Club’s petition “raise[d] the fundamental issue of whether decisions made
during previous preconstruction permitting . . . should be reconsidered
when issuing or renewing a title V operating permit.”143
The EPA rejected Sierra Club’s petition to object to the Hunter Power
Plant’s Title V permit on the grounds that “the title V permitting process
is not the appropriate forum to review preconstruction permitting decisions.”144 Instead, the EPA held that the terms and conditions of prior
preconstruction permits “define [the] applicable SIP requirements for the
title V source” under § 70.2(1).145 Therefore, the terms and conditions of
such permits will be incorporated into the Title V permit “without further
review of whether those conditions were properly derived or whether a
different type of permit was required.”146 In reaching this conclusion, the
EPA acknowledged that it was adopting a position that differed from the
Agency’s prior interpretation of § 70.2(1) but argued that its new interpretation was more consistent with “Title V’s text, Title V’s structure and
purpose, and the structure of the Act as a whole.”147
First, the EPA argued that its new interpretation is more consistent
with the text of the regulation itself. As mentioned previously, the original proposed language of § 70.2(2) only would have applied to major
NSR permitting, reading “any preconstruction permits issued pursuant to
title I, part C or D of the Act.”148 However, the final text of § 70.2(2)
“makes clear that the EPA viewed the terms of all preconstruction permits as ‘applicable requirements,’ including minor NSR permits.”149 The
EPA found the regulation ambiguous because § 70.2(2) provides that the
terms and conditions of minor NSR permits are applicable requirements,
while § 70.2(1) provides that “any standard or other requirement” provided for in the SIP are applicable requirements.150 Thus, a latent ambiguity appears in the regulation when a source has duly obtained a minor
NSR permit, but there is reason to question whether the minor NSR permit was the appropriate type of permit under the Act and the applicable
SIP.151 On the one hand, § 70.2(1) suggests the preconstruction permit
should be corrected because major NSR is a “requirement” provided for
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
1991)).
149.
150.
151.

See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 6–7.
See id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 10 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,259 (July 21, 1992)).
Id. at 11.
Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 2020).
Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 9 (quoting 56 Fed. Reg. 21,738, 21,768 (May 10,
Id.
See id. at 8–9.
See id. at 10.
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in the SIP.152 On the other hand, § 70.2(2) suggests the terms and conditions of the minor NSR permit must be incorporated into the Title V
permit.153 Based on legal and policy considerations, the EPA adopted the
latter view.
Second, the EPA emphasized that its new interpretation matched the
EPA’s interpretation when the regulation was first promulgated.154 Because an agency’s contemporaneous interpretation of a statute is given
great weight, the EPA argued the Agency’s contemporaneous interpretation of its own regulation should also be given great weight.155 Moreover,
the EPA asserted its new interpretation was more consistent with the purpose of Title V. In enacting Title V, Congress did not intend to impose
“new substantive requirements”156 on a source but merely wanted to
“consolidate ‘existing air pollution requirements into a single document.’”157 Reading § 70.2(1) to require reevaluation of prior state permitting decisions is contrary to Congress’s intent for Title V because such
interpretation would impose new substantive requirements on a
source.158
Third, the EPA’s interpretation aligns with the structure of the Act as a
whole. Under Title I, Congress carefully laid out the appropriate forums
to challenge the validity of state preconstruction permitting decisions.159
Under this framework, states bear the “primary responsibility” for ensuring preconstruction permits comply with the SIP and the Act.160 According to the EPA, Title V includes “no clear indication that Congress
intended to alter the balance of oversight that the EPA [has] over state
preconstruction permitting.”161 Because Congress “does not alter the
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms,” the EPA refused to change the balance of oversight by adopting Sierra Club’s interpretation of the regulation absent clearer indication from Congress.162
Moreover, because state permitting decisions are “reached through a process that include[s] public input and the opportunity for judicial review,”
it would be inappropriate to second-guess these decisions via the “limited
administrative review process” afforded to the EPA under Title V.163
Fourth, the EPA argued its new interpretation is consistent with other
provisions of Title V. For example, § 7661a(b)(6) requires states to adopt
procedures that allow for “expeditious review of permit actions.”164 If
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 13–14 (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 414 (1993)).
Id. at 14.
Id. (citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
Id.
Id.
Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 2020).
Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6)).
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UDAQ were required to reevaluate prior permitting decisions for every
Title V permit it considered, its review certainly would not be “expeditious.”165 Furthermore, the forty-five-day period provided for the EPA to
review Title V permits is not conducive to “an in-depth and searching
review of every source-specific preconstruction permitting decision that
has previously been made.”166 Additionally, for other applicable requirements under Title V, the EPA does not second-guess the content of requirements derived through a process that provided for public notice and
comment and judicial review.167
Notably, the EPA’s refusal to correct state permitting decisions via Title V does not preclude the EPA or citizens from challenging a preconstruction permitting decision in an enforcement action as provided for
under Title I.168 The EPA’s interpretation “merely indicates that a title V
permit is not the appropriate venue to correct any such flaws in the
preconstruction permit.”169 In sum, the EPA held that its oversight role
under Title V is limited to “ensur[ing] that the terms and conditions of
the preconstruction permit are properly included as ‘applicable requirements,’ and that the permit contains monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting sufficient to assure compliance with those permit terms and
conditions.”170 Because Sierra Club failed to show that the Title V permit
was deficient in any of these regards, the EPA found that it had no obligation to object to the Title V permit.171
B. THE TENTH CIRCUIT REFUSES TO GIVE AUER DEFERENCE
EPA’S UNAMBIGUOUS REGULATION

TO THE

After the Hunter Order was issued, Sierra Club sought judicial review
of the EPA’s interpretation before the Tenth Circuit.172 In Sierra Club v.
EPA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Auer deference did not apply because the text of regulation was unambiguous, agreeing with Sierra Club’s
interpretation of the regulation.173 According to the court, major NSR is
an applicable requirement for Title V permitting because it is a requirement provided for in the SIP.174 As a result, the Tenth Circuit held that
the plain meaning of the regulation foreclosed the EPA’s interpretation
and vacated the Hunter Order.175
Although the EPA gave several arguments in favor of finding ambiguity, the court remained unpersuaded. First, the EPA argued that § 70.2(1)
should be read as a general catch-all that is limited by the more specific
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 20.
Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 899.
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provision in § 70.2(2).176 However, the court concluded § 70.2(2) does not
limit any of the other twelve requirements listed in the regulation because
the “applicable requirements” are defined as “the combination of ‘all’ of
the thirteen requirements.”177 Moreover, the court rejected the EPA’s argument that Sierra Club’s interpretation of § 70.2(1) makes § 70.2(2) redundant.178 The court reasoned that § 70.2(2) “would retain independent
meaning because requirements could appear in a Title I permit but not
appear in the state’s implementation plan.”179
Next, the EPA argued that the phrase “as they apply” in the introductory language of the regulation limits § 70.2(1) to only those requirements
in the SIP that were imposed in earlier preconstruction permits.180 In response, the court again emphasized language that the EPA relied on in its
argument to conclude § 70.2(2) merely “includes the terms from a
preconstruction permit” but does not “limit ‘applicable requirements’ to
the terms in earlier preconstruction permits.”181 Lastly, the EPA pointed
to language in the preamble to argue its new interpretation was consistent
with the EPA’s original interpretation of the regulation.182 However, the
court refused to consider this language because the text of the regulation
was unambiguous.183 Moreover, the court did not think such language
supported the EPA’s claim.184 For example, in response to language stating that “title V generally does not impose substantive new requirements,” the court asserted that the requirement for major NSR
permitting “is not a ‘new’ substantive requirement.”185
Additionally, the EPA pointed to language in the preamble of the final
rule emphasizing that Congress did not intend for Title V “to secondguess the results of any State NSR determination.”186 However, the court
countered that this language only refers to state determinations about
“the requirements within an NSR permit” but not to “the threshold issue
of whether major NSR requirements apply to a given source.”187 The
court also questioned whether the Hunter Order actually reflects the
original meaning of the regulation when the EPA’s longstanding position
contradicts such an interpretation.188 Finally, the court acknowledged
that the Fifth Circuit adopted the EPA’s interpretation in a decision pub176. Id. at 891.
177. Id. at 892 (emphasis added) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2011)).
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250, 32,276 (July 21, 1992)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 893.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,251 (July 21,1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)).
186. Id. (citing Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,289 (July 21, 1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)).
187. Id. at 894.
188. Id.
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lished in May of 2020.189 However, the Tenth Circuit did not see a conflict
because the Fifth Circuit based its decision on the EPA’s interpretation of
the statute rather than the regulation.190
C. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS THE EPA’S STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION UNDER SKIDMORE
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit’s decision where the Hunter Order was
directly at issue, the Hunter Order was only indirectly at issue in the Fifth
Circuit’s decision. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, Sierra Club
and the Environmental Integrity Project (EIP) petitioned the EPA to object to a permit issued to ExonnMobil’s Baytown Olefins Plant by the
Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ).191 In 2012, TCEQ
issued a Title I permit to the Baytown plant to build a new ethylene production facility.192 Because TCEQ had earlier issued a Plantwide Applicability Limitation (PAL) permit, known as PAL6, for the plant,
ExxonMobil received a minor NSR permit rather than a major NSR permit.193 PAL permits allow existing sources to bypass major NSR “for alterations if, as altered, the whole facility’s emissions do not exceed levels
specified in the PAL permit.”194 To be valid, the EPA must approve a
state’s PAL program.195
When ExxonMobil attempted to incorporate the minor NSR permit
into its Title V permit, Sierra Club and EIP filed complaints with TCEQ,
arguing that PAL6 violated federal PAL rules.196 TCEQ rejected these
arguments and submitted the Title V permit to the EPA.197 After the
EPA did not object to the Title V permit, Sierra Club and EIP submitted
a petition to the EPA.198 Relying on the Hunter Order, the EPA denied
the petition.199 EIP and Sierra Club then sought judicial review of the
EPA’s denial of the petition, arguing that the statute unambiguously foreclosed the EPA’s interpretation under the Hunter Order.200 Ultimately,
the court deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of the statute.201
In reaching this decision, the court first determined the level of deference to afford to the EPA’s statutory interpretation.202 The court recognized that the EPA relied on its interpretation of the regulation rather
189. See id. at 896 (citing Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 960 F.3d 236, 247 n.6 (5th
Cir.), withdrawn, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020)).
190. Id. at 897.
191. Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2020).
192. Id. at 538.
193. Id. at 539.
194. Id. at 536 (quoting New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
195. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7410).
196. Id. at 539.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 540.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 539.
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than the statute for both the Hunter Order and ExonnMobil Order.203
However, because the EPA argued for Chevron deference only, the court
solely examined the EPA’s statutory interpretation.204 Although the
court never explicitly stated whether the statute was ambiguous, the court
implicitly indicated its view that the statute was ambiguous in determining the level of deference to apply.205 Ultimately, the court concluded
that it did not need to consider whether Chevron deference applied because the EPA’s statutory interpretation was “persuasive” under
Skidmore.206
The court found the EPA’s interpretation persuasive “based principally
on Title V’s text, Title V’s structure and purpose, and the structure of the
Act as a whole.”207 First, the court agreed with the EPA’s argument that
Title V “lacks a specific textual mandate requiring the agency to revisit
the Title I adequacy of preconstruction permits.”208 Without such a mandate, under the casus omissus pro omisso habendus est canon, the court
refused to interpret the statute “to include a matter it does not include.”209 Moreover, the court endorsed the EPA’s argument that, in
comparison to the “stringent oversight authority” Congress provided for
in Title I, the lack of such provisions in Title V suggests Congress intended for the EPA to have more limited oversight under Title V.210
Next, the court considered the EPA’s argument that its interpretation
better reflects the structure and purpose of Title V. The court adopted the
EPA’s view that Title V was intended to “add clarity and transparency . . .
to the regulatory process” by “consolidat[ing] into a single document (the
operating permit) all of the clean air requirements applicable to a particular source.”211 Moreover, the court concluded that the EPA’s interpretation was more consistent with the Act’s overall structure.212 As the court
noted, Congress designed the Act as an “experiment in cooperative federalism” under which states bear the “primary responsibility” of implementing standards set by the EPA.213 Given this structure, the court
determined the applicable requirements clause relied on by Sierra Club
and EIP was “too ‘general’ and ‘broad’ to upset the Act’s balance of
power.”214 The court also thought the language to which the EPA pointed
in the preamble of the final rule was indicative of “Congress’s intent for
Title V,” given that it was written “shortly after [Title V’s] enactment.”215
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
2008)).
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 540 n.6.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 545.
(quoting Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 2012)).
(quoting Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 15).
at 544.

at 540.
at 541.
at 542.
at 543–44 (quoting Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir.
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Additionally, the court acknowledged that the EPA had changed its approach but concluded that it could still defer to its present position.216
Lastly, the court suggested that EIP and Sierra Club’s view did not align
with the short time period Congress gave the EPA to review Title V permits.217 Therefore, the court upheld the EPA’s interpretation under Skidmore and denied Sierra Club and EIP’s petition.218
IV. ANALYSIS
A. THE TENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION: THE RIGHT RESULT UNDER
KISOR
The Tenth Circuit’s decision not to defer to the EPA’s unambiguous
regulation under Auer reflects the necessary result under the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence. Because Kisor requires judges to “exhaust
all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction” before determining that a regulation is ambiguous,219 a court will almost always conclude that a regulation is unambiguous and impose what it believes to be “the best and
fairest reading”220 of the regulation.221 As several scholars have suggested in recent years, judges use canons “strategically, to justify judicial
policy preferences or to frustrate clear legislative intent.”222 Moreover, as
Karl Llewellyn famously demonstrated, “For virtually every canon of
construction, . . . there [is] another canon that [can] be employed to reach
the opposite result.”223 Thus, judges are able to substitute one canon for
another, depending on their desired result.
Even in 1995, Richard J. Pierce, Jr. observed that “[t]he Court now
rarely defers to an agency’s construction of ambiguous statutory language
because a majority of Justices . . . attribute ‘plain meaning’ to statutory
language that most observers would characterize as ambiguous or internally inconsistent.”224 As a result of this “hypertextualism” (as Pierce
called this phenomenon), courts contravene the intent of Congress by attributing plain meaning where evidence strongly suggests that Congress
216. Id. (citing Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 416–18 (1993)).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 546.
219. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
220. Id. at 2430, 2448 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
222. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005) (first citing Stephen F. Ross,
Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45
VAND. L. REV. 561, 562 (1992)); and then citing Edward L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose
Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 579, 583–87 (1992)).
223. Ross, supra note 222, at 561 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950)).
224. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 752
(1995).
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intended a different result.225 The trend in hypertextualism has only become more prevalent since 1995 as evidenced by Justice Neil Gorsuch’s
recent statement that “judges are, to one degree or another, ‘all textualists now.’”226
Arguably, as more and more judges have adopted a hypertextualist approach to reading statutes and regulations, support for the deference doctrines has declined. Indeed, one of the biggest proponents of overturning
Auer was Justice Antonin Scalia227 who coincidentally wrote the majority
opinion in the case.228 According to Justice Scalia, judges should use the
traditional tools of interpretation to determine the “fairest” reading of a
regulation.229 Justice Gorsuch’s Kisor concurrence, joined by Justices
Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, suggests these four conservative Justices
would also support overturning Auer.230 Similar to Justice Scalia, Justice
Gorsuch believes the “cure” for Auer is to “redirect[ ] the judge’s interpretive task back . . . toward the traditional tools of interpretation . . . to
elucidate the law’s original public meaning.”231
For the more conservative Justices, “The text of the regulation is
treated as the law, and the agency’s policy judgment has the force of law
only insofar as it is embodied in the regulatory text.”232 Thus, if a judge
determines that the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the regulation’s
text, the agency must adopt the judge’s interpretation unless the agency is
willing to go through the burdensome process of amending the regulation
via notice-and-comment rulemaking.233 Considering that judges can use
the traditional tools of construction to make regulations mean what they
want, a hypertextualist approach leaves little room to defer to an agency’s
policy preferences when the regulation is ambiguous.234 Additionally,
with Justice Amy Coney Barrett replacing the late Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, there may be enough votes to overturn Auer altogether. Although Justice Barrett’s stance on the deference doctrines is unclear, she
is a strong proponent of textualism and will likely favor relying on the
traditional tools of interpretation to determine plain meaning.235 In sum,
with a majority of the Justices being hypertextualists, the Court may finally overturn Auer. Moreover, even if the Court maintains Auer, in a
225. Id.; see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 222, at 6.
226. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2442 n.99 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, “We Are All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 303, 304 (2017)).
227. See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J., conurring in part and dissenting in part).
228. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 454 (1997).
229. Decker, 568 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., conurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
231. Id. at 2442.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Pierce, supra note 224, at 779.
235. See generally Amy Coney Barrett & John Copeland Nagle, Congressional
Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2016).
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case such as this one, a majority of the Court likely would conclude § 70.2
is unambiguous, and therefore, Auer would not apply.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision depended on whether the court determined that § 70.2 is ambiguous.236 If the court had determined that the
regulation was ambiguous, Auer likely would have applied because the
EPA’s interpretation would have met the other requirements for receiving Auer deference. First, the EPA has a strong argument that its interpretation is “reasonable” based on text, structure, and history of Title
V.237 Second, the EPA’s interpretation would be entitled to “controlling
weight”238 because it reflects the agency’s “official position,”239 “implicates [the agency’s] substantive expertise” on the relationship between
Title I and Title V,240 is not “merely a convenient litigating position,”241
and does not create “‘unfair surprise’ to regulated parties.”242
While the Court may be more reluctant to give Auer deference because
the EPA’s new interpretation conflicts with its previous one,243 this limitation would not apply in this case. The reasoning behind this limitation is
that it prevents “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.244 However, in this
case, the EPA’s new interpretation actually lessened the administrative
burden on regulated parties because state permitting authorities no
longer have to reconsider the accuracy of Title I permitting decisions
every time a Title V permit is filed or renewed.245 Moreover, this interpretation does not “impose[ ] retroactive liability on parties for longstanding conduct that the agency had never before addressed.”246
Instead, this interpretation would relieve major and minor sources from
being subject to changing requirements every time they update their Title
V permit.247 Therefore, the EPA’s new interpretation would not cause
“unfair surprise.”248 In conclusion, if the Court determined § 70.2 is ambiguous, the EPA’s interpretation would receive Auer deference.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club reflects the pitfalls of a
hypertextualist approach to regulatory interpretation. While the court
could have used any number of tools to interpret the regulation, the
Tenth Circuit decided to rely solely on the plain meaning of the text.249
By solely considering the text of the regulation and not the facts at issue,
236. Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 891 (10th Cir. 2020).
237. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.
238. See id. at 2416 (first citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142,
155 (2012); and then citing U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31, 236–37 (2001)).
239. See id. at 2416 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 257–59, 258 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
240. See id. at 2417.
241. See id. (quoting Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155).
242. See id. at 2418 (quoting Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 170
(2007)).
243. See id. at 2418.
244. Id. (quoting Long Island Care, 551 U.S. at 170).
245. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 14.
246. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155–56).
247. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 14.
248. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Long Island Care, 551 U.S. at 170).
249. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 891 (10th Cir. 2020).
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the court only considered whether § 70.2 was patently ambiguous. However, with the facts of the Hunter Order in mind, a latent ambiguity appears in the regulation. As the EPA acknowledged, the applicable
requirements clearly include the terms and conditions of Title I major
NSR permits under § 70.2(2).250 However, this does not mean “major
NSR permits constitute the only source of ‘applicable requirements’ from
preconstruction permits.”251 Instead, applicable requirement means “any
term or condition of any preconstruction permits issued pursuant to regulations approved or promulgated through rulemaking under title I.”252
This language reflects a change from the original proposed language of
§ 70.2(2), which only would have included major NSR permitting.253
Thus, the terms and conditions of both major and minor NSR permits are
applicable requirements under § 70.2(2).254
Prior to the Hunter Order, the EPA understood § 70.2(1) to require
that a source obtain a validly issued preconstruction permit because obtaining the appropriate type of permit (either a major or minor NSR permit) is a requirement provided for in the SIP.255 However, “in
circumstances where a source has obtained a legally enforceable preconstruction permit” that may not be “the appropriate type of permit” under
the SIP, there is a conflict between § 70.2(1) and § 70.2(2).256 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit vastly oversimplified the analysis in concluding that the applicable requirements unambiguously include “major NSR requirements”
simply because “Utah’s implementation plan requires major NSR.”257
The court’s conclusion especially does not make sense in light of its argument that “the ‘applicable requirements’ are defined as the combination
of ‘all’ of the thirteen requirements.”258 The text of § 70.2(2) clearly includes the terms and conditions of a minor NSR permit as applicable requirements for Title V permits.259 However, because the terms of major
and minor NSR permits will conflict, they cannot both be incorporated
into a Title V permit. Thus, under the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of
§ 70.2(1), § 70.2(1) and § 70.2(2) cannot both be applicable requirements
owing to the conflict between the terms of major and minor NSR permits.
Moreover, the court rejected the EPA’s argument that Sierra Club’s
interpretation would render § 70.2(2) redundant on the grounds that “requirements could appear in a Title I permit but not appear in the
[SIP].”260 However, under 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C), states must estab250. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 9 (noting that “Parts C or D[ ] of the Act” refers
to “both PSD (part C) and nonattainment NSR (part D) permits”).
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2011)).
253. Id.
254. See id. at 9–10.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 10.
257. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 891 (10th Cir. 2020).
258. See id. at 892 (emphasis added) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2011)).
259. 40 C.F.R. § 70.2(2) (2011).
260. Sierra Club, 964 F.3d at 892.
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lish the requirements for obtaining Title I PSD and nonattainment NSR
permits in their SIP, and thus, the EPA approves of such permitting program when approving the SIP.261 The court’s lack of knowledge about the
Clean Air Act reflects why Congress presumably would want the EPA,
rather than any court, to decide what the regulation means.262 Additionally, the court’s reliance on the fact that “[n]owhere does the regulation
limit ‘applicable requirements’ to the terms in earlier preconstruction permits” falls flat because neither does the regulation require the EPA to
“second-guess the results of any State NSR determination” as the Tenth
Circuit holds.263 In fact, language in the preamble of the final rule suggests imposing such meaning would be inconsistent with the intent of the
agency that promulgated the regulation.264 However, the court misconstrued a provided example to conclude that “second-guess” “appears to
address how states implement the NSR requirements . . . , not the threshold issue of whether major NSR requirements apply to a given source.”265
This ignores that the language cited provides that the purpose of Title V
is “not to second-guess the results of any State NSR determination.”266
The Tenth Circuit’s decision demonstrates the dangers inherent in relying on “semantic resources, such as dictionaries or syntactic canons of
construction,” to resolve latent ambiguities in a regulation.267 In fact,
“Most academics think it contrary to the spirit of Chevron to rely too
heavily on semantic resources to clarify latent ambiguity in the text of an
administrative statute.”268 Thus, it is also “contrary to the spirit” of Auer
“to rely too heavily on semantic resources” to resolve latent ambiguities
in administrative regulations.269 Although the Supreme Court would
likely agree with the Tenth Circuit that § 70.2 is unambiguous as explained above, the Court could still reach a different result. As Karl
Llewellyn once proved, the canons of construction can be easily manipulated by judges to reach their preferred result.270 Given the wide range of
tools in a judge’s toolbox, the Justices could easily interpret § 70.2 differently, especially considering that the Tenth Circuit relied solely on the
plain meaning of the regulation. As discussed below, a number of practical considerations may lead the Court to uphold the EPA’s interpretation
of § 70.2.

261. EPA, supra note 19, at 3.
262. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2413 (2019).
263. See Sierra Club, 964 F.3d at 892–93 (quoting Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed.
Reg. 32,250, 32,251 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70)).
264. See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,251.
265. Sierra Club, 964 F.3d at 894.
266. See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. at 32,251 (emphasis added).
267. John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517,
1530 (2014).
268. Id. at 1530 n.65.
269. See id.
270. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 223.
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B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION: THE BETTER RESULT
For several reasons, the Fifth Circuit reached a better result in upholding the EPA’s interpretation. However, the court reached this result for
the wrong reason. As noted above, the court relied on the EPA’s interpretation of the statute rather than the regulation because the EPA only
argued for Chevron deference.271 But as the Tenth Circuit pointed out in
its opinion, SEC v. Chenery Corp. should have led the Fifth Circuit to
interpret the regulation instead of the statute.272 Under Chenery, “in
dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency
alone is authorized to make, [a reviewing court] must judge the propriety
of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”273 In both
the Hunter Order and the Baytown Olefins Plant petition, the EPA invoked its interpretation of § 70.2 as its basis for denying the petitions.274
Thus, the Fifth Circuit should have “judged the propriety of such action”
solely based on the EPA’s interpretation of the regulation and not the
statute.275
Despite the fact that the Fifth Circuit’s analysis was questionable, the
court reached a better result than the Tenth Circuit. If the Fifth Circuit’s
case were to reach the Supreme Court, the Court could reach the same
result as the Fifth Circuit and uphold the EPA’s interpretation of § 70.2.
First, the EPA’s interpretation is more consistent with Congress’s intent
for Title V. For example, the fact that Congress provided for “‘in-depth
oversight of case-specific’ state permitting decisions” in Title I but not in
Title V suggests that “Congress did not intend to recapitulate the Title I
process in Title V.”276 The abbreviated timeframes Congress provided for
the EPA to review Title V permits further supports this conclusion.277
Moreover, as several courts have recognized, Congress did not intend
for Title V to impose any new requirements on sources.278 Instead, Title
V permits were intended to bring “clarity and transparency . . . to the
regulatory process to help citizens, regulators, and polluters themselves
understand which clean air requirements apply to a particular source of
air pollution.”279 Further, Title V requires state programs to provide for
“expeditious review of permit actions.”280 However, if a state permitting
authority is “required to reevaluate . . . [final permitting decisions] each
time it renews [a] title V permit . . . then it could require substantial resources and unsettle expectations and reliance interests on the part of the
271. Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 540 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020).
272. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882, 897 (10th Cir. 2020).
273. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
274. See Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 539; Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 8.
275. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196.
276. Env’t Integrity Project, 969 F.3d at 542.
277. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b).
278. See U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra Club v.
Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004).
279. Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2008).
280. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6).
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state, owner/operators, and the broader public.”281 This is especially the
case given that Title V permits must be reviewed every five years.282
Second, the EPA’s interpretation better aligns with the structure of the
Clean Air Act as a whole. As several courts have noted, Congress intended the Act to be an “experiment in cooperative federalism.”283 Indeed, Congress gave the states broad authority to implement the
provisions of Title I284 and Title V,285 while the EPA’s authority generally
is limited to “approv[ing] or recall[ing] SIPS it finds inconsistent with the
Act.”286 Nothing in the legislative history for Title V suggests Congress
intended to give the EPA more oversight over state preconstruction permitting.287 Thus, § 70.2 should not be interpreted to allow the EPA to
second-guess state preconstruction permits. Moreover, the common criticism that Auer deference creates “a systematic judicial bias in favor of the
federal government, the most powerful of parties, and against everyone
else” would not apply in this case.288 Instead, the EPA’s interpretation
“respects the finality” of decisions made by state permitting authorities289
and shifts “the balance of oversight” over preconstruction permitting
back to the states as Congress intended.290
Third, the EPA’s new interpretation aligns with the interpretation
adopted by the EPA when the regulation was promulgated. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that “the agency that promulgated a rule is in [a] ‘better position [to] reconstruct’ its original meaning.”291 In this case, language in the proposed rule indicates that the
EPA’s new interpretation aligns with that expressed contemporaneously
with the regulation’s promulgation.292 For instance, the EPA stated, “[i]f
the source meets the limits in its NSR permit, the title V operating permit
would incorporate these limits without further review.”293 Moreover, the
EPA also clearly indicated that “[t]he intent of title V is not to secondguess the results of any State NSR program.”294 These statements directly
align with the new interpretation the EPA adopted under the Hunter Or281. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 16.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(5).
283. Luminant Generation Co. v. EPA, 675 F.3d 917, 921 (2012) (quoting Michigan v.
EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
284. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
285. See id. § 7661a(d).
286. Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(k)).
287. See id. at 536 n.1
288. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
289. See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 18.
290. See id. at 15 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
291. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991)); see also Mullins Coal Co., v. Dir., Off. of Workers’
Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987).
292. See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 12–13.
293. Operating Permit Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 21,712, 21,738–39 (proposed May 10,
1991) (emphasis added) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
294. Id. at 21,739 (emphasis added).
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der.295 Further, a court should not refuse deference simply because an
agency has changed its interpretation over time. As the Supreme Court
has held, an agency “is not estopped from changing a view [it] believes to
have been grounded upon a mistaken legal interpretation.”296
Fourth, the EPA’s new interpretation is consistent with its public meaning as represented by the EPA in the proposed rule and the preamble of
the final rule. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies must
provide the public with notice of any proposed legislative rule.297 Agencies publish these notices in the Federal Register with the full text of the
proposed rule and a preamble that explains each provision298 and “respond[s] to material public comments in detailed ways.”299 Once published, the agency must give the public an opportunity to comment on the
proposed rule, and the final rule must be a “‘logical outgrowth’ of the
[proposed] rule.”300 These “[p]rovision-by-provision analyses in preambles are the most reliable sources of the text’s public meaning because
they are subject to review by multiple veto-gate actors, including the
President, Congress, and the courts.”301 Thus, the Fifth Circuit reached
the right result by upholding the EPA’s new interpretation because the
previous interpretation allowed the agency “to strategically skew the
meaning of [the] text away from what it publicly conveyed earlier.”302
Fifth, it is inefficient to interpret Title V to require state permitting
authorities and the EPA to second-guess “preconstruction permitting decisions that have already been subject to public notice and comment and
an opportunity for judicial review.”303 For example, in the 1997 Approval
Order issued for the Hunter Power Plant, UDAQ alerted the public that
additional emission limits would be imposed so as not to trigger the PSD
permitting requirements.304 In accordance with the provisions of the
Clean Air Act, Sierra Club could have submitted comments objecting to
the 1997 Approval Order, yet Sierra Club failed to do so.305 Moreover,
under Utah’s Administrative Procedure Act, Sierra Club could have challenged the Order in state court, yet Sierra Club failed to do so.306 Essentially, in relying on the Title V process to object to a preconstruction
permit issued over twenty years ago, Sierra Club sought a “second bite at
the apple.”307 Because the EPA’s new interpretation refuses to give challengers a “second bite at the apple,” it preserves administrative resources
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 12–13.
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993).
5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
Nou, supra note 4, at 111.
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 17.
Id.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a(b)(6), 7661d(b)(2).
Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 17.
Id.
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and protects the settled expectations of affected parties.308
C. CURING KISOR’S CHAOS: THE NEED TO RESTORE AUER
AWAY WITH IT

OR

DO

One of the biggest benefits of Auer as originally understood was that
“it impart[ed] . . . certainty and predict-ability to the administrative process.”309 Because Auer was straightforward and easy to apply, it avoided
circuit splits by “ensur[ing] that courts across the country g[a]ve the same
meaning to ambiguous regulations.”310 However, over the years, the Supreme Court has imposed increasing limitations on Auer, transforming it
from “a seemingly simple legal standard into a doctrine of uncertain
scope and application.”311 Arguably, these limitations have reached a
point where the Supreme Court has effectively overruled Auer despite
purporting to uphold it.312
Given that “regulations, rather than statutes, are the principal way in
which legal rights and obligations are established,” the Supreme Court
should prioritize uniformity and clarity when refining Auer in the future.313 To accomplish these goals, first and foremost, the Court needs to
decide whether Auer stays or goes. Of these two courses, the better option is to restore Auer to its original “plainly erroneous or inconsistent”
standard.314 Additionally, a second step should be added to the analysis
when the agency’s new interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation.
Under this second step, courts would take a “hard look” to see if the
agency provided a reasoned explanation for changing its interpretation.315 This standard gives agencies the flexibility to reinterpret regulations in response to changing circumstances while also allowing courts to
ensure the agency’s proposed interpretation aligns with “what the law
is.”316
The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence effectively overrules Auer
and makes it highly unlikely that courts will defer to agency expertise,
even on purely policy matters. As Kisor recognized, the agency’s interpretation should control when “the law runs out, and the policy-laden
choice is what is left over.”317 However, the line between questions of law
and policy is often blurred, and a judge’s legal toolkit is broad. Thus, the
Court’s current conception of Auer leaves little room to conclude that a
308. Id.
309. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
310. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 13, at 104.
311. Id. at 105.
312. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425, 2443 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
313. Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of the Seminole
Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787, 832
(2014).
314. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
315. See Nou, supra note 4, at 88–89.
316. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
317. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415.
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regulatory interpretation question is “more [one] of policy than of
law.”318 Kisor’s command for courts to exhaust all the tools of interpretation before concluding a statute is ambiguous essentially directs courts to
determine the “best and fairest reading” of a regulation.319 As a result,
judges end up substituting their policy preferences for those of the
agency. Out of respect for the agency’s technical expertise and the authority delegated to the agency by Congress,320 judges should leave such
policy choices to the agency unless the agency’s interpretation directly
conflicts with the regulation.321
Moreover, the Court’s recent limitations on Auer have only increased
confusion in the lower courts as demonstrated by the circuit split discussed in this Comment. As Justice Gorsuch recognized in his Kisor concurrence, “retaining even this debilitated version of Auer threatens to
force litigants and lower courts to jump through needless and perplexing
new hoops.”322 Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that there has been a
steady decrease in the rate at which lower courts grant Auer deference
since Justice Scalia first criticized Auer in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan
Bell Telephone Co.323 Once upon a time, Auer was known as a “superdeference” doctrine324 because agencies won 90.9% of the cases where
the Supreme Court invoked Auer.325 However, since 2013, the agency win
rate under Auer at the appellate level has decreased from 82.3% to
70.6%.326 This finding is unsurprising given the Supreme Court’s rising
skepticism of the doctrine, yet the declining rate of deference comes at a
cost: increased confusion in the lower courts.
In the statutory interpretation context, the Court’s unyielding reluctance to find ambiguity in statutes has eroded Chevron deference, making
it more difficult for agencies to carry out their statutory obligations.327 A
similar pattern is emerging in the context of regulatory interpretation.328
Prior to Kisor, Kevin O. Leske demonstrated the inconsistency among
courts of appeals in applying and interpreting the Auer standard.329 Kisor
did very little to remedy this confusion. The Court’s failure to provide
meaningful guidance on how to determine when Auer does not apply relegated Auer to the level of “a doctrine of uncertain scope and application.”330 As a result, the meaning of a regulation could differ “depending
318. Id.
319. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
320. See id. at 2412–13 (majority opinion).
321. Nou, supra note 4, at 148–50.
322. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
323. Barmore, supra note 101, at 815–16.
324. J. Lyn Entrikin Goering, Tailoring Deference to Variety with a Wink and a Nod to
Chevron: The Roberts Court and the Amorphous Doctrine of Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Law, 36 J. LEGIS. 18, 48 (2010).
325. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 100, at 1104.
326. Barmore, supra note 101, at 816.
327. Pierce, supra note 224, at 753, 763–64.
328. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2430 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
329. See generally Leske, supra note 313.
330. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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on which circuit hears the case.”331
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision to retain Auer in a “zombified”
state332 despite constantly criticizing the doctrine has led to extreme confusion in the lower courts. “Uniformity and consistency are hallmarks of
our administrative and judicial states,” yet the confusion surrounding
Auer’s application in the lower courts greatly undermines these goals.333
To restore uniformity and consistency within the administrative state and
the judiciary, the Supreme Court needs to decide whether Auer stays or
goes.
Considering that a majority of the Justices on the Court are strict textualists, the Court seems well-positioned to finally overrule Auer. If the Supreme Court does decide to overrule Auer, there are three primary
solutions that have been proposed to replace it. The first proposes that
judges review regulations de novo,334 the second proposes replacing Auer
with Skidmore deference, and the third proposes establishing an Auer
Step Zero.335 Under the first view, judges would attempt to determine
the “best and fairest” construction of the regulation using all the traditional tools of interpretation.336 However, as suggested above, this view
can lead judges to disregard strong evidence to the contrary and find
“plain meaning” where it does not exist.337 Moreover, while the Court
has explained how statutes should be interpreted in immense detail, the
Court has devoted very little attention to how regulations should be interpreted.338 Thus, if the Court does adopt this form of review, the Court
should take additional steps to clarify how judges should approach regulatory interpretation.
Indeed, “[d]espite the fact that regulations overwhelm statutes in number and scope, neither judges nor scholars have confronted regulations
with the level of interpretive sophistication applied to constitutions, statutes, or contracts.”339 The tools of regulatory interpretation should not be
the same as those used in statutory interpretation. Regulatory interpretation needs to account for the fact that regulations are much more detailed
and technical than statutes.340 Moreover, as opposed to statutes, regulations are subject to comments from regulated parties and the general
public; thus, the focus should be on ascertaining the regulation’s public
meaning rather than its “plain meaning” as interpreted by the judge.341
331. Leske, supra note 313, at 832.
332. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
333. Leske, supra note 313, at 832.
334. William Yeatman, Note, An Empirical Defense of Auer Step Zero, 106 GEO. L.J.
515, 516 & n.7 (2018) (citing Regulatory Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, 115th Cong.
(2017) (as passed by the House of Representatives, Jan. 11, 2017).
335. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 108–10 (2018).
336. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
337. See Pierce, supra note 224, at 779.
338. Nou, supra note 4, at 88–89.
339. Id. (footnote omitted).
340. See id. at 107–09.
341. See id. at 106–08, 116.
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By providing lower courts with more guidance on regulatory interpretation, the Court could bring some much-needed clarity to administrative
law.
The second solution is replacing Auer with Skidmore deference.342
However, after Kisor, the Skidmore and Auer analyses overlap almost
entirely,343 making it doubtful that Skidmore will resolve any of the issues
that Auer has generated. Moreover, lower courts may be even more uncertain about how to apply Skidmore compared to Auer.344 Additionally,
given the overlap between these doctrines, one could criticize Skidmore
deference for all the same reasons Auer has been criticized. In effect,
trading Auer for Skidmore will not remedy the issues pervading administrative law.
The third solution suggests that courts should incorporate an “Auer
step zero,” similar to Chevron’s step zero, under which only those regulatory interpretations that have the force of law would be entitled to deference.345 However, this will further complicate the job of lower courts.
Indeed, some courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in Environmental Integrity
Project, engage in “Chevron avoidance” and decide the case on other
grounds because the Chevron analysis has become so convoluted.346 Further modification to Auer will bring more confusion to administrative law
and could result in Auer avoidance. Therefore, the Court should restore
Auer to its original conception rather than overrule it.
Restoring Auer to its “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard347 will bring some clarity to administrative law and ensure that regulations have the same meaning regardless of which court
hears the case. Such a standard allows the court to meet its obligation to
say “what the law is” while also respecting the agency’s policy expertise.348 Additionally, by adding a second step to the analysis when an
agency’s new interpretation conflicts with a prior one, courts can ensure
the agency is not merely changing its interpretation to achieve its political
agenda.349 Under the hard look doctrine, agencies are allowed to change
a prior policy position as long as the agency provides a reasoned explanation for the changed position.350 It makes little sense why agencies should
not also have the same flexibility to change their position when a regulation is involved as long as the agency’s new interpretation is not “plainly
342. Walker, supra note 335, at 108.
343. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
344. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 73, at 1291.
345. See generally Yeatman, supra note 334.
346. See Env’t Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 2020).
347. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 453 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
348. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
349. See Nou, supra note 4, at 148–50 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
350. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43, 56–57; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–16 (2009).
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”351 Requiring an agency to
show that it took a hard look before changing its interpretation of a regulation “balances the need for agency flexibility to update regulatory policy, on the one hand, against the countervailing needs for fair notice and
accountability, on the other.”352
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, the conflict between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits over the
meaning of the Clean Air Act’s applicable requirements demonstrates
the strong need for the Supreme Court to take decisive action as to
whether Auer will stay or go. As a result of this circuit split, the Clean Air
Act’s applicable requirements for purposes of Title V permitting have a
different meaning in the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. Unless the EPA
changes its interpretation through notice-and-comment rulemaking or the
Supreme Court resolves the conflict, affected parties will be left with little
guidance on what the law is in their jurisdiction. Regulations cannot continue to take on different meanings depending on which court hears the
case. The Supreme Court needs to take action to ensure that regulated
parties and the broader public are able to discern what the law is so that
they can conform their behavior accordingly.
If the Supreme Court were to consider the issue, the Court likely would
agree with the Tenth Circuit that the EPA’s regulation is unambiguous.
However, this does not necessarily mean the Court would reach the same
result as the Tenth Circuit. In fact, although the Fifth Circuit utilized
flawed reasoning, the Court could reach the same result as the Fifth Circuit and uphold the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act’s applicable requirements for Title V permitting. As discussed in this Comment,
the Fifth Circuit’s decision reaches the correct result because the EPA’s
new interpretation better aligns with congressional intent for Title V, the
structure of the Act as a whole, the drafting agency’s original interpretation, and the regulation’s public meaning. Moreover, this interpretation
preserves judicial and administrative resources and protects reliance interests by preventing challengers from getting a “second bite at the
apple.”353
Considering the drastically different results reached in the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, the Supreme Court should prioritize clarity and uniformity when addressing Auer in the future. Maintaining Auer in this “zombified” state354 has only complicated the analysis for lower courts and will
likely lead to the rise of Auer avoidance. In response to skepticism over
Auer, scholars have proposed primarily three solutions for remedying its
defects: (1) direct courts to review the regulation de novo to determine
351. See Nou, supra note 4, at 90 & n.31, 148–50 (first quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461;
and then quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414).
352. Id. at 149–50.
353. Hunter Order, supra note 36, at 17.
354. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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the “best and fairest” construction,355 (2) replace Auer with Skidmore
deference, and (3) impose an “Auer step-zero,” deferring to only those
regulations that have the force of law.356 However, none of these solutions will bring the clarity or uniformity needed in administrative law.
Instead, the Court should restore Auer to its original framework and
take a “hard look” when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior
one.357 Under this framework, courts can defer to agency expertise on
policy choices while still carrying out the judiciary’s duty to say “what the
law is.”358

355. See Yeatman, supra note 334; Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425–48 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
356. See Walker, supra note 335.
357. See Nou, supra note 4.
358. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

